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ABSTRACT 
Network security is vital in wireless networks that are widely used today. We 
desire wireless networks that maintain a high degree of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. Wireless sensor networks pose unique challenges and limitations to the 
traditional schemes, which are used in the other wireless networks for security protection, 
and are due mainly to the increased vulnerability of physical attacks, energy and 
communication limitations. This thesis introduces the foundations of a network and 
anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) tool, including both hardware and 
software components, that can be used for traffic profiling and monitoring of a wireless 
sensor network. The work demonstrates how the IDS should capture and store traffic and 
use this information to create traffic profiles and baselines for normal traffic behavior. 
Then it describes how these baselines can be used to generate alerts based on traffic 
variations that imply possible attacks. Profiles on typical implementations of wireless 
sensor networks were observed and analyzed. Finally, initial indications from basic 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Human need has always been the factor that has driven all technologies and 
applications. Today with the wide spread of internet and wireless communications, the 
human need for real-time sensing of the environment has emerged which has led to the 
development of wireless sensor networks. Although other wireless technologies have 
been implemented for many years and many issues have arisen and been solved, these 
networks pose unique challenges. Physical vulnerability, energy and communication 
constraints distinguish sensor networks from the IEEE 802.11 family wireless networks. 
These dissimilarities impose extra security vulnerabilities that the existing protocols and 
tools cannot address effectively. 
One way of addressing network security is through intrusion detection. A 
network-based anomaly intrusion detection system requires a packet sniffer. A packet 
sniffer is a device composed of hardware and software components that can be used to 
capture and store the exchanged data within a network. The procedure that should follow 
consists of two parts. The first part deals with capturing the data and analyzing the 
exchanged traffic to identify traffic characteristics. This traffic profiling and 
categorization can be used as a baseline of normal behavior. The second part simply 
compares real-time traffic characteristics with normal traffic and checks if differences 
would apply. The major advantage of this technique is that it can identify all possible 
attacks (not only the known ones). 
The layered architecture for the motes that were used follows the two lower layers 
of the OSI model where the physical and Medium Access Control (MAC) layers adhere 
to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. This is especially true for the physical layer, which was 
implemented into hardware within a CC2400 Chipcon transceiver. The upper layers were 
modeled by Crossbow Inc. applications, such as Xmesh and Surge, and complied with the 
Zigbee alliance higher layer architecture. The operating system that handles the 
intercommunication between hardware and software components was TinyOS. The 
traffic profiling was based on the MAC layer packet structure and  
 
 xvi
more specifically upon the Active Message index. This index is used by Xmesh and is 
used to handle the incoming packets from the MAC layer to the appropriate application. 
It is very similar to the TCP port number.  
In this thesis, a packet sniffer consisted of a java program sniffer and a hardware 
sniffing component. Specifically, a TelosB mote was used to capture the traffic between 
three motes.  Two basic deployment topologies for the motes were used. In the first case, 
the motes were in line of sight and within radio distance of the base station. In the second 
scenario, the one mote was put out of radio distance of the base mote so that its data 
would have to be relayed by the other mote, creating a “parent-child” relationship. 
All data were stored on a laptop computer that ran the packet sniffer device in a 
comma separated value (CSV) format, which was then imported into an excel 
spreadsheet for statistical analysis. The analysis was based on grouping the packets in 
terms of Active Message index and then comparing the destination and originating 
address, interarrival times, and packet payload length. This process revealed the 
following. 
Each traffic type occupied a different percentage of the total traffic. It was found 
that the data traffic encompassed 71%, health and routing traffic 23%, and finally 
acknowledgement 6% of the total traffic. 
Examination of the packet length and the interarrival times of the packets in 
different time aggregations, in a variance-time plot on a logarithmic scale, indicated that 
the traffic is self-similar. That was also witnessed by visual examination of the traffic, 
where each packet type was clustered. This means that every packet is largely dependent 
on the previous packets received, and upon reception of a specific message type, the same 
packet type is more likely to be received. 
A comparison of the different packet type payload lengths and interarrival times 
revealed some discrepancies with the protocol specifications with very large variations, a 
fact which requires further investigation. 
 xvii
The payload lengths observed extended from 11 to 27 bytes and never exceeded 
29 bytes, which is the maximum packet length for the protocol used. Different packet 
types used specific payload lengths. 
To summarize, the traffic categorization, according to Active Message type, held 
enough information to characterize the traffic, the java program Sniffer can be used as a 
network-based, anomaly-based, intrusion detection system. The overall traffic 
demonstrated long range dependency since was found to be self-similar with high Hurst 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Wireless Sensor Networks are becoming important for many commercial and 
military applications where real time information is needed and there is lack of 
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. These networks consist of a number of 
sensors, usually tens to thousands, and are spread throughout a specified geographical 
area.  Some examples of these networks are the following [1]: 
1. Military networks, designed to detect and gain information about an enemy’s 
location and movement, weapon explosions, and chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear attacks. 
2. Wireless sensor networks that detect and monitor environmental changes across 
plains, forests and oceans.  Agricultural operations are a good example in this category. 
3. Infrastructure monitoring wireless sensor networks, which monitor vehicle 
traffic on highways, the congested parts of cities and other similar applications. An 
extension in this area is the security monitoring of large public areas, such as malls and 
parking garages, and control and monitoring of machines in industries. 
In such environments as briefly described above, IT infrastructure is not present 
or is very poor, and cabling is prohibited due to cost, time or access. The most 
inexpensive, quick and reliable way of information collection can be provided by the 
deployment of a wireless sensor network. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a tool that would allow investigating 
traffic characteristics of unattended wireless sensor networks consisting of motes 
interacting in a traditional setting. More specifically, the proposed tool allows the 
identification of different packet types that include control, management, routing and user 
data, and categorizes traffic in such way to allow for the identification of anomalies and 




C. RELATED WORK 
All packet-based networks, both wired and wireless, are vulnerable to attacks, a 
fact that provides a very good background of what we should expect in a wireless sensor 
network and serves as very good point for further research. One of the tools that is widely 
used today, as a traffic analysis, diagnosis and attack tool, is a packet sniffer. 
For the family of IEEE 802.11 wireless networks, widely used packet sniffers are 
Ethereal [2], Tcpdump [3] and others. Those programs are widely used to analyze 
network traffic, to detect network intrusion attacks, to provide network statistics, and/or 
to capture sensitive information from other networks.  
A packet sniffer for TinyOS-based wireless sensor networks was designed by 
Hong-Siang Teo [4] and was used to validate some of the security properties that exist in 
such a sensor network. This packet sniffer was modified by this thesis, with the addition 
of several components that served the functionalities needed for traffic analysis and 
profiling, according to specific components of the Medium Access Control (MAC) 
header and payload. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I contains an introduction to the thesis and aims to familiarize the reader 
with wireless sensor network applications and related work in the literature. Chapter II 
provides background information and a discussion of the evolution of wireless sensor 
networks as well as their components. It also discusses why these networks are becoming 
very popular nowadays, increasing their share in the market. In Chapter III, a detailed 
description of the hardware components and their specifications that were used in this 
experiment is provided. This chapter closes with a layout of the experiment, describing 
how the wireless sensor network was deployed, what hardware components were used, 
and how the traffic was captured. 
Chapter IV deals with the software components. It provides an analysis of the 
protocol used to handle the information exchange in this network and emphasizes the 
components which this thesis is going to use for the categorization of the data traffic. 
Chapter V provides a description of the software used for the traffic capturing, 
emphasizing the three programs that were written for this purpose and providing a 
3 
detailed analysis of their functionality. The detail of the program code is printed in 
Appendix A. The analysis and profiling of the traffic follows in Chapter VI, and the 
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II. BACKGROUND THEORY FOR UNATTENDED SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
It is evident that the research of commercial and military Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSN) is growing exponentially. This fact can be manifested by the increasing 
number of searches conducted through Internet sources, such as Google. In August 2003 
there where 8,000 hits for WSN while today the number of hits exceeds 26,000 [5]. There 
has also been an increase in the amount of annual workshops, some of which include 
IPSN (Information Processing in Sensor Networks), SenSys, EWSN (European 
Workshop on Wireless Networks and Applications) and other conference sessions 
dedicated to this subject, such as ISIT, ICC, INFOCOM [5], and the IEEE 
Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and 
Networks (SECON) [6]. Many vendors today offer a variety of applications and motes 
which are able to accomplish almost any kind of commercial and military need for 
remote, real-time applications and more are to come. 
Compared to the use of a few, large, expensive but highly accurate sensors, it is 
more cost efficient to deploy a large number of inexpensive sensors that offer the 
advantage of a smaller total system expenditure with much higher spatial resolution, 
higher robustness, uniform coverage, and ease of deployment, anywhere and anytime 
with reduced energy consumption [5]. These inexpensive sensors are lower in cost when 
compared to microprocessor systems, which is due to advancements in technology that 
have permitted the manufacture of such low cost motes.  
As mentioned above, the small sensor motes achieve higher spatial resolution, in 
comparison to complex microprocessor systems within a similar-sized geographical area, 
because the sensing of the environment is done by a large number of motes instead of just 
one. Appropriate algorithms at the receiver use correlation across the received data to 
enhance the received signal and output more accurate reading/results. Higher robustness 
is achieved by dense deployment of the motes in a geographical area where a number of 
nodes may fail but the sensor system is still able to read and transmit acceptable 
information.  This is another advantage over a single microprocessor system, which if it 
fails it will cause the loss of its functionality in a given area.  Also, uniform coverage can 
6 
easily be achieved with the appropriate distribution of the sensors in the area of interest, 
in comparison to the single microprocessor sensor, where it is limited to placement in the 
center of the interest area. One final advantage of the lower cost system is that it can be 
placed anywhere and anytime since it does not require human attention or the need of 
physical presence in the area of interest, which can be hazardous or unreachable.  The 
system can be distributed by airborne vehicles, such as airplanes or helicopters [5].  
The uniqueness of an unattended wireless sensor network is that since human 
presence is not necessary the system can automatically perform node setup and network 
boot-up.  The network must be able to make dynamic adjustments in order to be able to 
handle the changes in the environment and to itself.  That means it should also be able to 
optimize its functioning, be able to fine tune work flow to achieve predetermined goals 
and be able to recover from routine or extraordinary events that might cause it to 
malfunction. The network must also have the capability to discover problems, such as 
uncovered areas due to mote(s) malfunctions and to find alternate resources and routes to 
keep it functioning properly and smoothly.  Finally, it must detect, identify and protect 
itself against various types of attacks in order to maintain overall system security and 
integrity.  
This thesis will build tools and create profiles that can be used by the network 
administrator, to gather and monitor the traffic of an unattended wireless sensor network 
and identify the various attacks as mentioned in the paragraph above. 
A. APPLICATIONS  
This paragraph will provide, in more detail than in the introduction, some 
applications areas of the wireless sensor networks, used today, as well as some 
experimental projects that have not been utilized yet but most likely will be seen in the 
near future.  
1. Military Applications 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are becoming a very important part of the 
military command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance and targeting systems.  In the battlefield, the tendency of the targets is 
that they will become smaller and less detectable, and that they will have higher mobility 
and the ability to move in any kind of terrain and environment [5], [7].  It seems that a 
7 
WSN deployed in high density environment where the potential target is or is expected to 
be proven an excellent source of information for the detection of the hostile forces, 
remote sensing of the release of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and in a 
variety of other remote sensing operations.  Also, commanders can monitor the status and 
location of their troops, weapons and supplies in order to improve military command, 
control and communications [5], [7] as well as smart minefields that can sense the 
intruders and react appropriately. 
2. Environmental Detection and Monitoring 
The spread of tiny, inexpensive motes in a wide geographical area can be used for 
many types of applications such as flood detection, air and sewage monitoring, climate 
control in very large buildings, soil composition in agriculture, forest fire detection, and 
geophysical studies as well as to survey the plant and animal population.  
Also, appropriate sensors can be used for crop and livestock monitoring and 
management in a very large agricultural area, where physical monitoring is mandatory 
but time consuming, or sometimes inaccessible. In such situations, with the deployment 
of the appropriate sensor network, soil and plant elements can be monitored, and based 
on the resultant readings the fertilizer concentration needed can be calculated with 
accuracy and in real time. 
In the field of the seismic activity detection, a WSN that consists of 
accelerometers can provide a much finer scale than having a single sensor for a very large 
area since motes can be deployed with a very high density within the same area of 
interest.  
Also, wireless sensor networks can assist in the monitoring of fresh water quality 
in a remote area where sampling is difficult, or even impossible. Several sensors can 
sample and analyze the water, and then transmit the results accordingly.  
Finally, in the area of disaster detection and prevention, such as forest fires and 
floods, a deployed wireless sensor network can monitor temperature and water levels, and 




3. Civil Engineering and Home Intelligence 
Monitoring of structures like bridges in order to detect and to warn of structural 
weakness, or the reaction of tall buildings to wind and earthquakes are some of the civil 
engineering applications of WSNs [5], [7]. 
In the area of home intelligence, WSN applications can provide smoke detection 
in order to prevent fires and their spread; automate the reading of gas, water and 
electricity reading/levels; and facilitate safety monitoring through remote surveillance to 
detect intruders.  
4. Health Monitoring  
WSNs can record physiological data, such as body temperature, blood pressure, 
pulse and other readings, which can be sensed and transmitted automatically to a 
physician or doctor. In the same manner additional sensors can analyze the blood stream 
periodically and provide 24-hour coverage of personal health [5], [7]. 
Remote virus monitoring can be performed in an area that has been infected, and 
it is not yet safe to humans. These readings can be used by a virus control center in order 
to determine the spread of the virus and to assist in making decisions, such as when to 
send appropriate medical support. 
B. ELEMENTS OF WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
Wireless Sensor Networks consist of ten to thousands of ultra-small fully 
autonomous computing and communicating devices with very restricted energy and 
computing capabilities. These devices cooperate to quickly and efficiently accomplish a 
large sensing task in a remote area where no cabling is present or human presence is 
restricted due to several conditions [5]. 
As illustrated in Figure 1 below, a “Sensor Node” consists of two basic 
components: a sensor and a mote.  The sensor part can be defined as the component that 
is able to detect/sense physical phenomena such as heat, light, sound, acoustic pressure, 
acceleration and vibration, and it is usually a cluster of sensors placed on a board.  The 
sensor then transforms the readings into an electrical signal and transmits it to the 
processor, which is usually on the same board, for further processing [1].  These devices 
will be better detailed, examined and presented in the next chapter where an analysis of 
9 
the sensors used for the experiment is provided.  The mote component consists of a 
microcontroller with a sensor application and networking software, a low power radio 




Figure 1.   Basic elements of a Wireless Sensor Network (From Ref. 1). 
 
C. TECHNOLOGY COMPONENT EVOLUTION 
The evolution of each of the elements of a wireless sensor network has  enabled 
us today to be able  to manufacture  very small motes, that are  able to perform many 
tasks and to be deployed almost anywhere having the ability to be self-managed, self-
organized, self-healing and self-diagnostic [5]. These technologies can be broken down 
into three major categories: digital circuitry, wireless communications, and 
microelectromechanical systems (MEMS). 
It was not long ago when the first computers were quite large in size especially in 
comparison to the size of a human, as can be seen starting from upper left corner of 
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pictures in Figure 2 and moving towards the lower right corner [1]. These sizable pieces 
of machinery used to occupy an entire room. Today extensive advancement in technology 
has enabled the manufacture of Personal Computers (PC) that can fit on a small desk, 
laptops which are easily transportable in small bags, PDA’s – which are also known as 
Palm Pilots because of their size – to fit in one’s hand, and motes that are equivalent to 
the size a coin, if not smaller.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Illustration of decreasing in size of computational devises vs. time (From Ref. 
1). 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the size of tiny motes in comparison to a penny [8]. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Solar powered, bi-directional communications & sensing (acceleration, 






1. Digital Circuitry 
With digital circuitry discovery and evolution [5], electronic devices have become 
extremely fast enabling them to perform millions of operations per second; tasks that 
would have taken humans years and years of effort, all the while performed with no 
mistakes. But not only the calculation power has increased dramatically - and of course it 
will continue to increase - the size of the circuit required became extremely small. Today 
there are devices that are built much larger than they need to be so that humans can hold 
them in their hand to operate them. 
2. Wireless Communications 
The evolution in wireless communications using MEMS that is briefly described 
in the next paragraph assisted in the manufacture of very small transmitters and receivers.  
The use of different and multiple coding schemes permitted an increase in the rate of 
transmitted data within the same bandwidth, as well as the energy per single bit that is 
transmitted.   
Table 1 shown below, gives a good illustration of how the motes have been 
reduced in size, as well as some other characteristics like weight, topology and power 
supply modules from the different vendors.  The illustration includes information from as 
early as 1980, what we have today and peaks into the future to show what is expected in 





Table 1.   Chronological evolution of motes from different vendors in terms of size, 
weight, power supply, topology, deployment methods. (From Ref. 1) 
 
3. Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) 
Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) are the integration of mechanical 
elements, sensors, actuators and electronics on a common silicon, polymer or metal [7] 
substrate through microfabrication technology [8], [9], [10]. 
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While the electronics are fabricated using integrated circuit (IC) process 
sequences (e.g., CMOS, Bipolar, or BICMOS processes), the micromechanical 
components are fabricated using compatible "micromachining" processes that selectively 
etch away parts of the silicon wafer or add new structural layers to form the mechanical 
and electromechanical devices [8], [9], [10] .  
MEMS bring together silicon-based microelectronics with micromachining 
technology, making it possible to have a complete systems-on-a-chip. MEMS is an 
enabling technology allowing the development of smart products, augmenting the 
computational ability of microelectronics with the perception and control capabilities of 
microsensors and microactuators, and expanding the space of possible designs and 
applications [8], [9], [10].  
Microelectronic integrated circuits can be thought of as the "brains" of a system 
and MEMS augments this decision-making capability with "eyes" and "arms,” to allow 
microsystems to sense and control the environment.  Sensors gather information from the 
environment through measuring mechanical, thermal, biological, chemical, optical and 
magnetic phenomena.  The electronics then process the information derived from the 
sensors, and through some decision making capability, direct the actuators to respond by 
moving, positioning, regulating, pumping and filtering, thereby controlling the 
environment for some desired outcome or purpose. Because MEMS devices are 
manufactured using batch fabrication techniques similar to those used for integrated 
circuits, unprecedented levels of functionality, reliability and sophistication can be placed 
on a small silicon chip at a relatively low cost [8], [9], [10].  
Figure 4 illustrates how small these devices can be by comparing a gear set which 





Figure 4.   Gear set produced using MEMS compared with a mite (From Ref. 8).   
 
D. SUMMARY 
The multiple advantages of a wireless sensor network consisting of small and 
inexpensive motes versus a similar network consisting of micromotes was discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter, and it was explained why the wireless sensor network are 
more reliable and effective. Also the different existing applications that draw on this 
evolution, such as military, environmental, home intelligence, agricultural, and health 
monitoring have been briefly mentioned. Three different technologies that contributed to 
wireless sensor network development, digital circuitry, wireless communication and 
MEMS, were discussed and all together laid the necessary background to introduce the 
specific motes used in Chapter III. 
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III. SENSOR MOTE TYPES 
This chapter will provide a brief introduction to the hardware used in this thesis as 
well as the layout and setup of a wireless sensor network. In this network, three 
Crossbow Micaz motes along with a base programmer and station which consisted of one 
Crossbow MIB510 and a Micaz attached to a desktop PC. The above components created 
the wireless sensor network from which traffic was captured and categorized based on the 
active message packet type into three major categories: routing, data and broadcast.  The 
sniffing device used to capture the traffic was a Crossbow TelosB mote attached to a 
notebook computer. This arrangement provided mobility and allowed the packet sniffer’s 
distance and position to be changed in relation to the WSN. 
A. MOTE TYPES AND DESCRIPTION 
1. Micaz mote 
Figure 5 shows the basic components of a Micaz mote along with the circuitry 
layout. The mote consists of an Atmel ATMega128L microprocessor, a Chipcon CC2420 
radio and antenna, external flash memory, a 64-bit Serial ID, a 51-pin connector, power 
connectors and indicator LEDs [1]. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Micaz hardware description (From Ref. 1).   
 
Table 2 provides some performance characteristics of the Micaz mote as 





Microprocessor: Amtel ATMega128L Memory: 128Kb of flash 
                   4Kb of SRAM 
Radio: Cripcon CC2420 Radio:          250Kbps data rate 
Encoding:     DSSS 
Modulation: O-QPSK  
Distance:      Up to 135m, LOS, 1/2 wave  dipole antenna 
Freq:             2400-2483Mhz 
External Serial Flash Memory 512 Kb 
51-pin expansion connector Eight 10-bit analog I/O 
21 general purpose digital I/O 
Power options/Energy consuption 2 AA cells, through 51-pin or 2-pin Molex 
Energy usage:1.8V x (5-10) μA 
Energy sleep:1.8V x 1 μA 
 
Table 2.   Micaz performance characteristics. (From Ref. 1) 
 
2. Telos Rev B Mote 
Figure 6 illustrates the TelosB mote; where as described above, some of the 
differences from the Micaz mote are exhibited.  The TelosB mote connects to a PC 




Figure 6.   TelosB hardware description (From Ref. 1).   
 
Table 3 provides the basic performance characteristics of the Telos rev B mote 




Table 3.   TelosB performance characteristics. (From Ref. 1) 
 
3. MIB 510 Programming Platform 
In order to be able to program the motes with the desired application and to be 
able to make changes to their power settings, group ID’s, mote ID, and any changes that 
are needed to be uploaded to the motes, a programmer board is needed. 
In Figure 7, a block diagram of the MIB510 programming board is laid out.  It has 
an RS-232 port, which is the programming communication link to a PC or any other 
external device that holds the application programs that are needed to be uploaded in 
order to operate the mote.  The MIB 510 has an on-board in-system processor (ISP), an 
Altemma 16L, which actually programs the mote as follows: the application code is 
downloaded to the ISP via the RS232 port, while the latter continually monitors/listens to 
the incoming serial packets.  It should also be mentioned that the MIB 510 facilitates the 
power needs for the mote that it is attached to and TinyOS has to be installed on the PC 
in order to program the motes [1] (a detailed description of a TinyOS can be found in 
Chapter V. 
TelosB Platform 
Microprocessor: TI MSP430F1611 Memory: 48Kb of flash 
                10Kb of SRAM 
Radio: Cripcon CC2420 Radio:          250Kbps data rate 
Encoding:     DSSS 
Modulation: O-QPSK  
Distance:      Up to 125m, LOS W/PCB inverted ‘F’ antenna 
Freq:             2400-2483Mhz 
External Serial Flash Memory 1024 Kb 
16-pin expansion connector 
Power options/Energy consuption 2 AA cells 
USB 
Energy usage:1.8V x (5-10) μA 
Energy sleep:1.8V x 1 μA 
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Figure 7.   MIB510 Serial Interface Programming board (From Ref. 1).   
 
4. MTS 310 Multipurpose Sensor Board 
The sensor board that was used in this experiment was the MTS 310.  As shown 
in Figure 8, this sensor board consists of a cluster of six sensors that are briefly described 
in the following paragraphs: 
a. Microphone and Tone Detector 
This can be used for acoustic ranging and acoustic recording and 
measurement. It consists of a pre-amplifier and a second stage amplification achieved 
with a digital pot control. 
b. Temperature Detector (Panasonic ERT-J1VR103J) 
A light detector based on a CdSe photocell with maximum sensitivity at 
the light wavelength of 690 nm. 
c. Two-axis Accelerometer (ADI ADXL202) 
A MEMS surfaced micro-machine that is used for tilt detection, 
movement and vibration.  It has a g  measurement range of 2± g  (1g = 9.81m/sec) and a 
resolution of 2 mg. 
d. Two-axis Magnetometer (HMC1002) 
A silicon sensor that consists of a very sensitive NiFe coating. It causes 
the bridge resistance to change when the magnetic magnitude is altered.  It can detect 
moving objects like automobiles at a radius of 15 feet. 
e. Sounder 
This device is a 4 kHz piezoelectric resonator. 
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Figure 8.   MTS 310 Multipurpose sensor board (From Ref. 1).   
 
B. EXPERIMENT LAYOUT 
In order to record the measurements for this experiment, the following 
deployment and devices were used, as mentioned above and illustrated in Figure 9. 
As shown for the traffic capturing purposes a laptop with a TelosB directly 
attached was used, a configuration that provided mobility.  The Wireless Sensor Network 
consisted of a base station − a MIB510 programming board with a Micaz mote attached 
on top base station and two additional Micaz’s with MTS 310 sensor boards attached on 
top and powered by two AA batteries. 
 
              
    
   
 
Figure 9.   Experiment layout with a base station on the top right. 
 
The two motes in Figure 9, where initially close to the base and had direct 
communication with it. Then they were purposely set at a greater distance from each 
Node 2 Node 1
Base MIB510/micaz 






other and from the base in order to force them to create a multi-hop relationship of 
parent-child.  This arrangement brought about the need for routing decisions to be made, 
and in consequence, the generation of routing traffic.  This means that Node 2 was child 
to Node 1, and the latter transmitted the aggregated data to the base.  The data was 
received at the base solely from Node 1.  Finally, the relative position and distance of the 
laptop was changed, which held the packet capturing device, to test the effect of the 
movement of the elements above for the quality of the packet capturing.  
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the two different configurations where traffic was intercepted were 
introduced, along with the criteria on how they were divided into two major categories; 
depending on the communication properties. Those were direct and parent-child 
scenarios. The first one identifies the communication scheme, where both motes were 
directly exchanging data with the base station, while in the second scenario Node 1 relays 
all the packet exchange from Node 2 to the base. Continuing with the description of this 
sensor network, it was explained how the network is divided into two basic components: 
sensor motes and the base station. The sensor motes used were Micaz with a XMT310 
sensor board, from Crossbow technologies Inc. Their basic specifications and capabilities 
were listed in Table 2 and Figure 5. Next, Table 3 listed the basic specifications for 
TelosB motes, which were used as the hardware part for the packet sniffer. 
The following chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Physical (PHY) and 
Medium Access Control (MAC) packet formats and their content, and a brief description 
of TinyOS and the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol stacks.  
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IV. SENSOR NETWORK TRAFFIC TYPES 
In this chapter, a brief description of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, TinyOS 
operating system and some protocols is presented, which will facilitate the analysis of the 
different types of traffic produced in a WSN. 
A. 802.15.4 AND ZIGBEE ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 10 illustrates, according to the OSI model layer stack, the architecture of 
IEEE 802.15.4 and Zigbee Alliance. Starting from the bottom layer and moving up, we 
have the Physical Layer followed by the Medium Access Control Layer, which are 
standardized by the IEEE 802.15.4 Working Group. The Data Link, Network and 
Application layers are defined by the Zigbee Alliance. On the top of the layer stack is the 
Application Layer, which can be developed by different vendors, so it can support any 
application’s needs [1].   
 
 
Figure 10.   IEEE 802.15.4 and Zigbee Layer Architecture (From Ref. 1). 
 
In this thesis, the layers that will be discussed are the Physical and Medium 
Access Control, since they contain all the information needed to categorize the traffic. 
Here it is important to mention, that those two layers are defined by IEEE 802.15.4, and a 
vendor or developer builds a package for the upper layers - Data Link to Application 
layer - which actually handle the manipulation of the two lower layers. If extra 
functionality and improvements are required to specific applications, they are facilitated 
with changes and modifications to the five higher layers. 
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The coexistence of the TinyOS and Xmesh sharing the same Physical and 
Medium Access Control layers is shown in Figure 11. Here on top of the PHY and MAC 
layers, two different layer stacks arise, as well as an interconnection bridge that facilitates 
the interconnection and communication between those two protocols suites [1]. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Xmesh and Zigbee protocol layering share the same MAC and PHY lower 
layer (From Ref. 1). 
 
A description of the PHY and MAC layers within the Tiny MicroThreading 
Operating System (TinyOS) is addressed in the following paragraphs. It is shown that the 
Active Message type used by Xmesh in TinyOS is very similar to the TCP port. Different 
Active Message types imply different network services, and so different types of traffic. 
The Crossbow Micaz and TelosB motes use the TinyOS research platform as a 
small operating system. From the Crossbow website [11]: 
TinyOS is an open-source operating system designed for wireless 
embedded sensor networks. It features a component-based architecture 
which enables rapid innovation and implementation while minimizing 
code size as required by the severe memory constraints inherent in sensor 
networks. TinyOS's component library includes network protocols, 
distributed services, sensor drivers, and data acquisition tools – all of 
which can be used as-is or be further refined for a custom application. 
TinyOS's event-driven execution model enables fine-grained power 
management yet allows the scheduling flexibility made necessary by the 
unpredictable nature of wireless communication and physical world 
interfaces.      
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B. TINYOS/XMESH PACKET STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS 
The information exchange between nodes and the base station is achieved with 
transmission of many small-sized packets. Figure 12 illustrates the format of one packet 
and its different fields. The process that takes place before a packet transmission, in 
respect to the lower layer (physical layer) is as follows: there is a delay up to 15 packet 
lengths of time, where a packet time equals the time needed for a packet to be 
transmitted. Next a delay of 250ms is followed by a preamble, which helps the receiver to 
synchronize it’s timer to the incoming data. The preamble ends with the Sync 
(synchronization) portion of the packet that informs the receiver it should be receiving 
the packet. The actual packet data follows which is 36 bytes in length for the Mica2 (41 
for the Micaz) [1]. 
 
 
Figure 12.   TinyOS Physical Message Packet (From Ref. 1). 
 
The green portion of the packet in Figure 12 maps to the TinyOS packet, which is 
the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer packet before it is encapsulated into the 
physical layer. It is divided into three parts and has total length of 41 bytes (for the 
Micaz), but it can be extended if needed up to 125 bytes (125 bytes long is supported by 
IEEE 802.15.4) [1].  
So starting with the first TinyOS section, the header has a length of 10 bytes and 
is further divided as follows. The first subdivision of the header section of the TinyOS 
packet structure is the Payload Length which has one byte of information and identifies 
the length of the payload carried in this packet. The Frame Control follows with two 
bytes and next is the Sequence Number which is one byte. The Sequence Number is used 
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to discard packets that have already been received and so protects from replay attacks. If 
a packet is captured and replayed afterwards the sequence number would have been 
already used and the packet is discarded.  The Destination PAN ID has two bytes and it is 
the 16-bit address of the mote. This is manually programmed to each mote, and ranges 
from 01 to 65000 with node address 0 usually reserved for the base. The Origin Address 
occupies two bytes and it stands for the sender address. Next, the TOS AM Type 
(highlighted in Figure 13 in green) uses one byte, and as has been explained already, 
provides the information regarding to the type of the packet, and will be used as one of 
the criteria to categorize the traffic type. Finally, the last field in the header section is the 
TOS Group ID which is similar to the network address of a group of motes, assigned to a 
cluster of motes performing a specific task. This allows the use of the same radio channel 
by several different groups of motes. In the case where a mote receives a packet with 
Group ID that does not much its own, it discards the packet [1]. 
The next section of the TinyOS packet is the payload that can hold up to 29 bytes 
of user or application data and the last section is the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) 
























Header (10) Payload (29) CRC (2) 
 
Figure 13.   TinyOS Packet Structure (From Ref. 1). 
 
Upon collection of the data to be transmitted, the TinyOS operating system 
running the Xmesh application takes the following message flow: Data or other 
information fills the message payload portion of the packet and then it is passed down the 
stack where the address of the next single hop destination is added. Continuing, the 
Active Message Type is specified. The complete packet with the format and additional 
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information as illustrated in Figure 13 is handed to the transmitting radio device, where it 
is delayed for up to 15 packet times (each packet time is about 4msec). Then a check to 
determine if the channel is clear is performed, where the channel access mechanism used 
is Carrier Sense Multiple Access Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). If the channel is free 
transmission occurs [1]. 
Now while in reception, the radio device upon the detection of the MAC header 
interrupts transmission, and reads the packet coming through the First In First Out (FIFO) 
buffer. Next verification that the sequence number received by the specific mote is 
correct occurs and if so the mote proceeds to read of the Group ID. If the group ID does 
not match, the packet is discarded. If the Group ID is correct the Active Message field is 
examined and depending on the AM type it is handed to the specific application [1]. 
A list with the Active Message Types and associated applications is shown in 
Table 4. In this experiment the AM numbers 3, 51, 246, and 250 where observed from the 
WSN while running Xmesh and the XMT310 applications. These AM numbers differ 
from application to application, and from vendor to vendor. For the Crossbow hardware 
and software components, as mentioned above, the  AM 3 corresponds to Health packets 
from motes to the base, AM 51 corresponds to the  environmental sensor measurements 
sensed from each mote (XMT 310 application), AM 250 is routing information packets, 
and AM 246 is an acknowledgement packet from base to the nodes [12]. 
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Table 4.   Identification Number for Active Message Types (From Ref. 12) 
 
Once the motes are deployed and powered they initiate transmissions to the all 
broadcast address, trying to enter any network which they have not joined. Upon 
reception of the route update message from the mote, the base station also transmits a 
route update message, and informs the mote that the base station is there and is able to 
hear the mote. The same message then goes from the mote to the base. Upon the 
reception of the last message, the mote and base have established communication and 
exchanged all the other information needed to start passing data. In the case that the base 
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is out of the radio coverage area of the mote, the same kinds of messages are exchanged 
between the mote and another mote which might be within radio distance [11]. In that 
case each mote listens to its neighbor and uses this information to populate a routing table 
of up to 16 neighbors (except for the base which builds a routing table of 40 neighbors).  
This relationship, which serves the relay of traffic between motes to the base, is called the 
parent-child relation. This decision considers which neighbor requires less energy to send 
the traffic to, and the minimum number of hops to the base. The maximum number of 
children assigned to a mote is 50 and it can go up to 100 for the base. Typically the 
interval of the Route Update Message, which as mentioned above has AM 250, is 360 
seconds for low power consuming transmission, and 36 seconds for high power. If no 
Route Update Message is received within a defined interval the mote will reboot [10]. 
The Route Update Messages (RUM) contains 4 basic information fields. The first 
information field contains the Parent ID number, or if the node has not joined the mesh 
network yet a 0xfff (broadcast) is transmitted. The second field is used for the cost that is 
needed to send a message to the base, followed by the number of hops necessary to reach 
the base. Finally in the last field is a list of the five most qualified neighbors as mentioned 
in the paragraphs above. Since each node keeps a routing table of 16 neighbors, 4 RUM 
messages of sequential counting are required to be sent [12]. 
The next type of packet observed in this experiment is the Health packet. There 
are two types of Health packets, the Statistics Health packet and the Neighbor Health 
packet. These are transmitted in an alternative fashion on every health update interval and 
have the same packet format [12]. The Active Message number ID for these is AM 3. 
The health packets include statistical information about the packets being sent by 
this mote, like number of packets transmitted, number of dropped packets and number of 
retransmissions. They also contain power information such as voltage readings and 
accumulated power usage. Finally, they include information about parent node ID, link 
quality and path cost. Neighbor health packets contain information about the mote’s 
neighbors and the link quality to these nodes, which is estimated by monitoring the 
number multihop headers and processing this with an exponentially-weighted moving 
average algorithm [12]. 
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There are two kinds of packet acknowledgements, the link level 
acknowledgement and the end-to-end. Data packets use the link level acknowledgement 
which requires retransmission between a sender and receiver until an acknowledgement 
is being received by the sender. Systems and application that require energy efficiency 
but not 100% delivery of data should use it. End-to-end acknowledgement packets are 
used by the health packets. In this case the base must receive and acknowledge the 
originator mote [12].  
Table 5 summarizes the properties listed above for different kinds of messages as 
well as the differences between the base station and the rest of the motes.  
 
Parameter Default Value Description Summary 
Data length 29 Bytes Maximum data for a TOS packet. It can be 
change with appropriate applications. 
Base Station Address 0 Node ID (or address) for base station. Should 
never been changed 
Route Update Interval 60 sec for High Power 
600 sec for Low Power 
Time Between health messages 
Descendant Table Size Base : 100 
Motes : 50 
Defines the maximum number of children to a 
mote. 
Data Message Rate 10 sec High Power 
180 sec Low Power 
Defines the transmission time interval for the 
data messages. 
Route Table Size Base : 30 
Motes : 15 
Defines maximum Number of neighbors that a 
mote can track. A mote that is not listed here 
can not be selected as a Parent node. 
Queue Size Base : 16 
Motes : 8 
Define maximum number of messages that can 
be queued. Once exceeded packets will be 
dropped. 
Table 5.   Summary of the Base and Motes messages properties and differences 
 
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter the MAC packet is parsed down into the elements that are used, in 
Chapter VI for traffic categorization. Through this process, it was illustrated that the 
MAC packet for the Micaz motes is 41 bytes in length, with a header of 10 bytes. The 
latter field included the following information: destination and originating addresses, 
group ID, active message index, and application information. Next, it was explained how 
different types of active message indices can identify different kinds of packet types, like 
routing, data, health and acknowledgement. Table 4 illustrated some of the possible 
active message types that can be found in the applications of the motes used in this thesis. 
Finally the properties and format of the routing, data, health and acknowledgement 
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packets are explained, since those were seen in this thesis. An example on how each of 
these is seen from the output of the packet sniffer follows in the next chapter as well as 
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V. TRAFFIC CAPTURE SNIFFER DESIGN 
As introduced and analyzed in Chapter IV, the scope of this thesis is to categorize 
the traffic, mainly according to the AM number ID contained in each packet exchanged 
within the WSN. Other data, such as payload data length, number of packets, interarrival 
time, and different AM type and node type, are also going to be used to extract statistical 
information and build a database with behavior patterns for a specific location, 
environment and number of motes. In order to facilitate this need, an existing packet 
sniffer [4] was used which was written initially by Hong-Siang Teo and was modified to 
meet the needs of this thesis.  
This sniffer was modified with the addition of several java programs (classes) 
named activeMessage.java, displayWindow.java and outputtoCsv.java respectively as 
well several code lines in the Sniffer class. Descriptions of these three classes as well as 
their functionality will be presented in the following paragraphs in this chapter, and the 
source code is included in Appendix A. 
A. SNIFFER ANATOMY 
The packet sniffer consists of hardware and software components. The hardware 
components were discussed in Chapter III, so no further description is needed. In Figure 
14 a block diagram of the packet sniffer is illustrated. From the left to right, we can see 
the WSN, which for this experiment consisted of three Micaz’s, whose traffic was 
captured using a TelosB mote as the packet sniffer hardware. The TelosB has been 
“flashed” (programmed) with TransparentBase. TransparentBase is a TinyOS application 
located under apps directory within Tinyos-1.x directory. The complete path is 
tinyos/cygwin/opt/tinyos-1.x/apps/TransparentBase. This application captures all the 
packets that it can hear and reports them back to the UART. It also forward’s all 
incoming UART messages out to the radio [13]. It is also a bidirectional bridge between 
the radio of the TelosB and the serial port, which has the ability to ignore the group ID 
and AM type and forward all packets to the PC (so all packets from all WSN in range 
will be captured with no limitation to tune the sniffer to a known group ID).  
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Within the PC the Serial Forwarder application instantiates a server which 
provides a bi-directional packet stream between a mote connected to the host PC and 
clients anywhere on the network [14]. SerialForwarder is located in 
tinyos/cygwin/opt/tinyos-1.x/tools/java/net/tinyos/sf directory, and it basically allows the 
communication of the application through a network interface rather than a serial 
interface. Some operating instructions and settings, which are required for the normal 
operation for the Serial Forwarder, are described in Appendix B. 
The last component of the packet sniffer is the java application Sniffer which 
extracts the information delivered by SerialForwarder, such as protocol and application 
information, and outputs this in a form which enables and allows further processing and 
analysis [4]. This is where this thesis has added three different java applications in order 
to facilitate the traffic categorization.  
 

















B. DESCRIPTION OF JAVA CLASSES  
The activeMessage.java is a program that uses the java tool 
java.util.StringTokenizer and allows the programmer to parse the elements of a larger 
string, such as the incoming TinyOS MAC packet, into as small elements as are needed. 
Incoming packets had the following structure: 17:07:46.781 TOS 125.65535.51 (27) 
[010001001200ff8481ffffae01cd014f03a001010001001c031c03]. Comparing this to the 
TinyOS MAC packet format and with the use of reverse engineering, an identification of 
each part was achieved. 
The packet output started with the time stamp, which in this example was 
17:07:46.781, which was assigned the string name packetTime by the activeMessage 
program. The next part is the string “TOS,” which was used to display the protocol 
information (TOS is an abbreviation for TinyOS) and was not needed for this experiment. 
This was followed by 125.65535.51. Those numbers were parsed down to three 
additional parts as follows: “125” corresponds to the Group ID and was given the string 
name packetGroupID, “65535” was the destination address (in this case broadcast) with 
the assigned string name packetDestination and finally “51” was the active message 
number with string name packetAM. Next followed “(27)” where the number within the 
parentheses corresponded to the payload length. It was assigned to the string name 
numberofBytes. The packet ended with the data portion where only the originating 
address was determined which corresponded to the first 5 digits within the bracketed 
string. In this example “[01000” was assigned to the string name PacketNoteID. Note 
here that comparing the received information to the packet format we expected to see, the 
last part, which is the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), is missing. The later was not 
needed for the traffic profiling, so no further investigation of this part was conducted.  
The output of the activeMessage java program was then given to the outputtoCsv 
and displayWindow programs for further processing. The outputtoCsv exports the above 
output to a CSV file, with values separated by commas, so it can be imported to an Excel 
spreadsheet for further analysis. There are two settings that the user might be required to 
change depending on user preferences. These are where this file should be stored and 
how many lines, which is equivalent to the number of packets, should be saved in each 
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CSV file. Starting from the latest, Excel spreadsheets have a limitation of 65535 lines so 
this program is configured to open a new CSV file every 60000 packets (or lines).  
The following code, which also listed in Appendix A paragraph B, points to the 
fields that the user can change depending of the number of packets the user might want to 
input into a file as well location that the files should be stored. 
 
String Filename="complete path where user wants to save the files"; 
   public void printTraffic (String packetGroupID, String 
packetDestination,String packetAM,String packetAM,String packetNodeID, String 
numberofBytes ) 
  { 
   count ++; 
   if (count == value of number of lines before opening new file) 
   { 
    Filename+="1"; 
   } 
   File cvs = new File (Filename);   
 
A good common practice, considering the purpose of this program, will be to set 
this value to 1000 packets or less, in order to run an analysis of the input traffic in short 
time intervals and determine any discrepancies that might have occurred. This topic will 
be addressed in more detail in Chapters VI and VII. 
The outputtoCsv java class opens a GUI window to enable the user to have a real 
time display of the incoming packets. In this program layout, where the WSN consisted 
of only few motes, the interarrival time of the packets was about 0.19 seconds and the 
user was able to observe any anomalies in the traffic. This is not realistic because in 
reality the WSN will consist of a minimum of hundreds of motes and the interarrival time 
will drop tremendously. 
C. OUTPUT 
Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the displayWindow Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
and the CSV file format, respectively. Starting from Figure 15 we can see that this 
window is labeled “Traffic Categorization” and displays six columns which are 
respectively: GroupID, Destination (address), AM (active message number), Time, Node 




Figure 15.   Illustration of the displayWindow java program; a GUI for traffic monitoring  
 









A brief description of Hong-Siang Teo’s packet sniffer for TinyOS [17] 
compatible motes was discussed followed by a detailed description of the functionality 
and properties of the three java programs that were added by this thesis. It was explained 
that the activeMessage.java program is used to parse the incoming packets, and then is 
passed to displayWindow.java and outputtoCsv.java programs, where the first one served 
the real time visualization of the MAC header information, and the latter the output in a 
suitable format of a CSV file. As explained, the CSV format is easy to be exported to an 
Excel spreadsheet, which is very convenient for further analysis. 
In the following chapter, it is shown how this packet information was grouped and 
categorized according to the Active Message type into four different categories, and what 
traffic profiles and patterns were discovered. Those patterns qualify a normal traffic 
behavior, which can be used to identify variations and anomalies when such network is 
under attack. 
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VI. TRAFFIC CATEGORIZATION FRAMEWORK 
In Chapters IV and V, the hardware and software components of a packet capturer 
for a sensor network consisting of Crossbow Micaz motes was fully explained and 
analyzed. This packet capturer can be considered and used as the sensor component of a 
possible Intrusion Detection System (IDS), for a TinyOS network. In this chapter, the 
traffic of three motes in two different topologies, as described in Chapter III, will be 
captured, stored and analyzed in detail to provide a baseline for normal  network 
behavior.  
There are several different kinds of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), depending 
on the network and the location of the sensor. These are summarized as follows: network 
intrusion detection systems, protocol-based IDS, application protocol-based IDS, host-
based IDS and finally hybrid IDS which is actually a combination or two or more of the 
above approaches [15].  
This thesis examines a network IDS. There are two kinds of network IDS 
depending on the detection method – signature-based and anomaly-based. The signature-
based IDS compares the network traffic to known attack patterns, and is supposed to 
detect all known attacks. An anomaly-based IDS, like the one developed in this thesis, 
scans the network traffic and analyzes it according to baselines and patterns of normal 
traffic behavior. The major advantage of this approach is that it can detect attacks that are 
not yet known, but it is subject to false alarms when the baselines are not accurate or 
when the administrator has assigned too narrow a deviation. Usually an IDS is composed 
of the following four parts:  event generators (E-boxes), event analyzers (A-boxes), event 
databases (D-boxes), and finally response units (R-boxes) [15]. 
An event generator is the device that captures the traffic, incoming and outgoing, 
and then passes it to the other IDS components. The event analyzers process and analyze 
the data that is coming from the event generator, and create traffic profiles and traffic 
behaviors. The event databases simple store the data from the two previous mentioned 
components, so the system administrators can access it anytime. The last component is  
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the response unit, which provides countermeasures when network intrusion is detected. 
For this thesis, the event generator component is the TelosB mote programmed with the 
TransparentBase application. 
Following the IDS component model introduced in the paragraphs above, the 
event analyzer follows and in this thesis can be mapped to the laptop on which the 
TelosB was attached. The applications that were necessary to perform the analysis and 
the statistical profiling of the incoming data are Sniffer and TinyOS. The incoming data 
was forwarded from the TelosB to Sniffer through Serial Forwarder. The 
displayWindow.java program provided a graphical User Interface for monitoring the 
traffic, and parallel the needed packet information were written into a CSV file with 
outputtoCsv.java. The statistical analysis was then performed offline, by importing the 
CSV to an Excel spreadsheet. All data was saved on the hard drive of the laptop which 
can be considered the event database, and finally no response unit component was 
developed.  
In the following paragraphs, the statistics of two cases are illustrated as well as 
basic behavior patterns. Section A refers to the layout where two Micaz motes are 
directly communicating to the base node, while in Section B Node1 relays all traffic from 
Node 2 to base, as well as its own traffic. 
A. TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
1.  Direct Motes to Base Connection 
In this first part, a total of 15,703 packets where captured in a time period of three 
hours and five minutes. The distance between the motes and the base was four meters and 
between motes two meters. The whole experiment took place within a room, and the 
motes where not moved.  
In Figure 17, the percentage of the traffic according to the active message type is 
illustrated. Of the 15,703 packets, 13.07% was with AM 3 corresponding to health type 
packets. Next, 70.97% of the traffic contained data packets, with AM 51. The last two 
types observed were acknowledgement packets with an AM 246, which were taking 
10.09% of the total traffic, while the route update packets with AM 250 where found to 
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Figure 17.   Traffic percentage statistics in accordance to Active Message type. 
 
Continuing with the traffic profiling, the packets where grouped according to the 
Active Message index, for further analysis. Starting with the Health packets (AM 3), it 
was observed that all packets were initiated from Nodes 1 and 2, with destination Node 0 
(base station) and had payload length of 27 bytes. More specifically the payload length 
started with 11 bytes and within the first packets stabilized to 27 bytes. Also the 
interarrival time at the base station for each node was 11.734 seconds for the messages 
originating from Node 1, and 11.735 seconds originating from Node 2. 
In the data packets (AM 51) for this specific application and vendor, the same 
originating source as well as payload length was observed as in the Health packets. The 
interarrival time for these messages was 2.046 seconds for traffic moving from Node 1 to 
base and 2.047 seconds when coming from Node 2. 
The acknowledgement packets (AM 246), were transmitted only from the base 
and had destination addresses of either one the two nodes or the broadcast (broadcast 
address is: 65535). The payload length for those packets was 11 bytes and the interarrival 
time interval from the base station to Node 1 was 12.219 seconds and to Node 2, 12.438 
seconds.  
The last packet type examined was the routing update packet (AM 250). Those 
packets were broadcasted by both motes and the base to a destination address 65535. The 
payload length was different for the base and nodes, with the base having payload length  
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21 bytes and the nodes 18 bytes respectively. The transmission interval time for the base 
station was 33.248 seconds, for Node 1 46.969 seconds and finally for Node 2 41.082 
seconds. 
Summarizing, as can be seen in Table 6, it was observed for this wireless sensor 
network setup that, depending on the packet type, specific constant values were used 
from both motes and the base, according to originating and destination addresses, and 
payload length. Any variation of those imposes integrity violations. 
 










1, 2 0 27 bytes 11.735 sec 
AM 51 
(Data Packet) 




0 1,2, 65535 11 bytes 1 : 12.219 sec, 
2 : 12.438 sec 
AM 250 
(Route update Packet) 
0, 1, 2 Broadcast 
(65535) 
0 : 21 bytes, 
1, 2 :18 bytes 
0 : 33.248 sec, 
1 : 46.969 sec, 
2 : 41.082 sec 
Table 6.   Traffic characteristics for all Active Message type on direct scenario. 
 
Integrity violations can easily then imply confidentiality violation, because if 
someone is able to modify the packets content they likely can see and read the traffic. In 
addition several other situations might arise if malicious code is placed in the payload. 
The latter could execute a program in both the motes and the base causing the network to 
collapse or transmit false readings as well as to cause availability issues by forcing the 
motes to transmit in shorter intervals causing battery consumption. 
2.  Parent-Child Network Deployment 
In this node deployment, where Node1 was relaying all traffic from Node 2 to the 
base the following statistics were observed.  A total of 5552 packets were captured within 
an hour and as will be analyzed in the following paragraphs very similar statistics as 
above were observed. 
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Figure 18 illustrates the percentage of the packets captured according to the 
Active Message type. We can see that the Health packets were 12.55% of the total traffic, 
and the Data packets 72.94%. Continuing, the Acknowledgement packets occupied 
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Figure 18.   Traffic percentage statistics in accordance to Active Message type for the 
Parent-Child setup. 
 
A comparison of these two setup variations is illustrated in Figure 19 where we 
observe a very small variation between the Health, Data and Acknowledgement packets. 

















Series1 12.55403458 72.94668588 10.82492795 3.674351585
Series2 13.07393492 70.97369929 10.0999809 5.852384895
1 2 3 4
 
 
Figure 19.   Traffic percentage statistics comparison in accordance to Active Message type 
for Direct Base-Motes communication and Parent-Child setup. 
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At this point, it is important to understand that different network deployments, 
number of motes, environmental conditions affect some of the traffic characteristics and 
should always be considered by the network administrator.  
Continuing, the analysis in this topology observed that the health packets (AM 3) 
were originated from Node 2 to Node 1 and then from Node 1 to the base station. Of 
course, in a larger network one would expect to see changes of the relay motes but not to 
the nodes that relay to the base (since they are the ones in the closest vicinity to the base). 
Those packets had payload lengths of 12 and 24 bytes, and the interarrival time for the 
packets originating from Node 1 was 7.410 seconds, and for those originating from Node 
2 18.655  seconds. 
Next, the analysis of data packets (AM 51) found the same statistics as seen in the 
first scenario examined above, except from the originating and destination addresses, 
which was normal and expected. A small variation in the transmission interval time was 
observed, where Node 1’s mean transmission time was 1.329 seconds, and for Node 2 
2.861 seconds. This was expected due to the relay radio communication. 
The acknowledgement packets (AM 246) where originated from the base station 
with destination Node 1 and broadcast, and from Node 1 to Node 2. That introduced an 
expected variation from the first scenario, where we had observed that only the base 
station was transmitting Acknowledgement packets. All these type of packets had 
payload length of 11 bytes. The transmission interval time from the base station to Node 
1 was 10.325 seconds and from Node 2 to Node 1 was 12.218 seconds. 
Finally, the routing update packets (AM 250) were broadcasted from all motes 
with payload lengths 15 bytes for Nodes 1 and 2, and 18 bytes for the base station. The 
mean transmission interval time, when originated from base station was found to be 
16.678 seconds, and for Nodes 1 and 2 was calculated to be 19.266 and 18.549 seconds, 
respectively. 
Table 7 summarizes the traffic characteristics that were analyzed in the above on 
the parent-child radio communications scenario. 
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Æ 1, 65535 
Æ 2 
11 bytes 1 : 10.325 sec, 




0, 1, 2 Broadcast 
(65535) 
0 : 18 bytes, 
1, 2 : 15 bytes 
0 : 16.678 sec, 
1 : 19.266 sec, 
2 : 18.549 sec 
Table 7.   Traffic characteristics according to active message types for the parent-child 
radio communication scheme.  
 
In Figures 20 and 21, we can see the packet payload lengths for both the direct 
and parent-child deployments respectively, and the number of packets associated with 
each. Starting with Figure 20, the number of packets associated with each payload length 
is 1605 packets with payload length 11 bytes, 1045 packets with payload of 12 bytes, 534 
packets with payload of 18 bytes, 358 packets with payload of 21 bytes, 1006 packets 
with payload of 24 bytes, and 11144 packets with payload of 27 bytes. 
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Figure 20.   Number of packets vs. payload length in direct communication scenario. 
 
In Figure 21, the number of packets associated with each payload length is, 601 
packets with payload length 11 bytes, 310 packets with payload of 12 bytes, 93 packets 
with payload of 15 bytes, 108 packets with payload of 18 bytes, 387 packets with payload 
of 24 bytes, and 4050 packets with payload of 27 bytes. We should mention here that the 
packets with payload of 15 bytes exist only in the parent-child topology and that 
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Figure 21.   Number of packets vs. Payload Length in Parent-Child communication 
scenario. 
 
In the above paragraphs, it was shown that when using the payload length as one 
of parameters of normal behavior, we expected to see packets of 11, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27 
bytes long. Other statistics as a percentage of traffic relative to Active Message index was 
proven to a reliable parameter. The above two parameters and how they are related to the 
associated addresses, originating and destination, node IDs, interarrival and transmission 
interval times, constitute unique traffic profiles. 
B. ESTIMATING SELF SIMILARITY IN WSN 
Another significant parameter for traffic analysis is the estimation of self 
similarity. Form ref [14]:  
A phenomenon that is self-similar looks the same or behaves the same 
when viewed at different degrees of “magnification” or different scales on 
a dimension. 
The parameter used to estimate self-similarity is the Hurst parameter (H), and 
provides a measure of its extent [20]. It was named after H.E. Hurst who studied water 
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levels of the Nile and other rivers. His research suggested that values of the Hurst 
parameter H = 0.5 indicate the absence of long-range dependence while for values of H 
= 1 indicate infinite long-term dependence [16]. In other words in the traffic examined 
above, for large values of H the longer it has been since the arrival of a data packet the 
longer it would be for the arrival of the next similar one, or if we want to express it 
differently the sooner a packet type of one kind has arrived the more likely it is for 
another one to arrive. For values of H less than 0.5 the arrival of a packet is independent 
of the arrival of the last packet of the same type. 
Another parameter used to model the extent of long term dependence introduced 
in the paragraph above is the β parameter [16]. The long-range dependence is defined in 
terms of the autocovariance and it is rapidly decreasing with time. A short-range 
dependent process satisfies the condition that its autocovariance decays at least as fast as 
exponentially while long-range dependent processes have a hyperbolically decaying 
autocovariance [16]: ( )    as ,   0 1C k k k−∝ →∞ < <β β . The Hurst parameter is related 
to the β parameter with the following relation:  H= 1 – (β/2) [16]. As mentioned above 
self similar traffic has a Hurst parameter equal to: 0.5 < H < 1 which means that the β 
parameter takes the following values: 0 < β <1. 
There are three common ways to measure self similarity: Variance-Time plot, R/S 
plot, and the computation of Whittle’s estimator from the spectral density [16]. For this 
thesis the first method was used.  
A discrete random process x is said to be exactly self-similar with parameter β and 
0 < β < 1 if for all m = 1, 2, … we have: 
 ( ) var( )var( )m xx
m
∼ β  (1) 
Then taking the logarithm of both sides of the previous equation, it allows to be 
written as [16]:   
  
 ( ) ( ) ( )mlog[var x ] log[var x ] log m⎡ ⎤ −β⎣ ⎦ ∼  (2) 
Now if we plot variance of x versus m on a log-log graph, the result should be a 
straight line with a slope of β. 
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For the WSN traffic analysis, the above formula was used for both topologies, and 
two plots for each were generated. First the logarithm of the variance of the payload 
length was computed for 7 different aggregated average payload length windows of 10, 
32, 100, 320, and 1000 packets. The corresponding plot is illustrated below in Figure 22. 
The treadline corresponding to this plot is: y = -0.0207x + 1.5543 which indicates that β 
parameter is equal to 0.0207 which according to the theory provided above suggests a 
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Figure 22.   Logarithm of Variance Payload Length vs. Aggregated Average Payload 
Length Plot for the direct scenario. 
 
Following the concept above the logarithm of the interarrival packet time versus 
the aggregated time is plotted in Figure 23. The β parameter was found equal to 0.1039 





























Figure 23.   Logarithm of the Variance of packet Interarrival Time versus Aggregated 
Time plot for the direct to base communication scenario. 
 
For the parent-child topology the same calculations as in the two paragraphs 
above were conducted, resulting in Figures 24 and 25. In Figure 24, the plot of the 
logarithm of the variance of the packet payload length versus aggregated average length 
is plotted that resulted in the following values for the β and H parameters: β = 0.0207 and 
H = 0.9897 values that suggest very long term time dependence.  
Variance-Time Plot
Parent-Child Scenario
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Figure 24.   Logarithm of variance of packet Payload Length versus Aggregated Average 
Packet Length plot for the Parent-Child communication scenario. 
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Following the steps above  the logarithm of the variance of the packet interarrival 
time versus aggregated time is illustrated in Figure 25 where from the slope of the 




































Figure 25.   Logarithm of the Variance of packet Interarrival Time versus Aggregated 
Time plot for the Parent-Child communication scenario. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
Summarizing, it was shown that in a wireless sensor network the active message 
index identifies different traffic type and can be successfully used as one way to 
categorize traffic. The three type of traffic observed were Data, Routing (Routing Update 
Message and Health packets), and Acknowledgements each of which had different 
payload lengths, originating and destination addresses. Those differences were explicit 
and any variation of these would imply a network attack. Next using the logarithm of the 
variance of payload length and interarrival time for different time and length aggregations 
showed that this traffic entailed self-similarity properties. It should be noted that the 
sample size of collected packets was relatively small, potentially skewing the results, 
however for the purposes of this thesis, they provide a good initial indicator. 
The percentage of each traffic type was obtained, which found that data traffic 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The human need for real time information on the physical environment has driven 
the evolution of many technologies and applications. The wireless sensor network 
satisfies that need, and the technology is growing exponentially. With sizes of less than 
one half of a hand or sometimes one tenth of a penny, these devices provide a large 
variety of information. Their applications extend from military to agricultural, from civil 
engineering to health monitoring, and from catastrophe detection to home intelligence. In 
areas that are not accessible or where there is no IT infrastructure, these networks provide 
an inexpensive, easy to use and install solution for remote sensing, in real time.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Traffic capture and analysis on a wireless sensor network was performed 
successfully and the statistical profiling that was performed revealed important 
information.  The traffic was characterized according to the Active Message (AM) index, 
an index that indicates the handling of each message to the appropriate application. Four 
different AM indexes were observed identifying Data, Routing, Health and 
Acknowledgement types of traffic. Specific payload lengths, originating and destination 
addresses, and interarrival times were identified for each packet type. Those traffic 
statistics and characteristics were capable of producing a baseline for normal behavior. 
The latter along with other parameters when compared with real time traffic patterns can 
alert for traffic anomalies, and so can be used as an intrusion detection tool. 
The examination of the packet length and the interarrival time of the packets in 
different time aggregations, in a variance-time plot on logarithmic scale, indicated that 
the traffic is self-similar. That was also witnessed by visual examination of the traffic, 
where each packet type was clustered. This means that every packet is largely dependent 
on the previous packets received, and upon reception of a specific message type, the same 
packet type is more likely to be received. 
A comparison of the different packet type payload lengths and interarrival times 
exposed some discrepancies with the protocol specifications as they were explained in 
Chapter V. The payload lengths observed ranged from 11 to 27 bytes and never exceeded 
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the 29 bytes, which was the maximum packet length for the protocol used. The Health 
messages have the same properties as the Routing update messages, and the interarrival 
time expected for low power radio transmission was 60 seconds. For the first direct 
scenario this was calculated to be around to 11.735 seconds, which introduces a large 
variation. A similar variation was found for the parent-child scenario with interarrival 
times 7.41 and 18.65 seconds for Node 1 and 2 respectively. Moving to the data 
messages, interarrival times were expected to be 10 seconds for high power transmissions 
and for the direct scenario was calculated 2.046 seconds. For the parent-child scenario, 
interarrival times were 2.861 and 1.329 seconds for Node 1 and 2 respectively. The 
routing updates message interarrival time was expected to be 60 seconds for low power 
and was measured, for the direct scenario, to be 46.969 and 41.082 seconds for each mote 
that introduced a small variation in comparison to the parent-child scenario. In the latter 
scenario the interarrival time was calculated to be 18.5495 and 19.266 seconds for the 
two motes, respectively. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Several topics are recommended for further research and are summarized as 
follows. 
A program that will generate alerts, based on the traffic anomalies produced with 
the comparison of normal to real time traffic, should be written and be added to the 
Sniffer program. Upon completion of this program, a functional intrusion detection 
system will be available. 
As seen in Chapter V, the CRC part of the packet was missing. The CRC is very 
important for the examination of modification of the message, and an investigation on 
why this part is not displayed and how this information can be captured should be 
performed. Also the algorithm that is used for the payload part of the packet should be 
retrieved, and the payload info should be used along with the rest packet information for 
the traffic profiling. 
In this thesis, a total of three motes were used for traffic capturing, where a 
significant variation on the traffic characteristics was observed between direct and parent-
child topologies. Traffic capturing and profiling should be performed in a larger network 
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consisting of 20 or more motes, deployed to cover a larger geographical area. Also two 
packet sniffers or more should be used for traffic capturing and then a cross comparison 
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APPENDIX A. 
A. SNIFFER JAVA CLASS 
This is the main class of the Sniffer program [2]. The highlighted with blue color 
are the lines added for this thesis. 
 
 
 /* Sniffer.java 
 * Main class for Sensor Network Sniffer. 
  * Copyright (c) 2006 Hong-Siang Teo, Naval Postgraduate School (hteo@nps.edu). 






import java.util.StringTokenizer; //added categorization 
import org.apache.commons.cli.*; 
import java.io.*;  //added 
 
public class Sniffer { 
 /* 
  * Attributes and Options. 
  */ 
 static String hostValue = "127.0.0.1"; 
 static int portValue = 9001; 
 public static long packetCount = 0; 
 public static long errorCount = 0; 
 static Source source = null; 
 static LinkedList<Output> outputsList = new LinkedList<Output> (); 
  
 /** 
  * @param args Command line arguments 
  */ 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
     
  /*Copyright (c) 2006 Georgios Kirykos, Naval Postgraduate School 
(gkirykos@nps.edu). 
 * All rights reserved.*/ 
 
 //**************************************************************** 
   
 outputtoCsv oscv = new outputtoCsv();//added for traffic categorization 




*********   
  /* 
   * The main work flow is as follows: 
   * - Parse arguments 
   * - Instantiates a Packer Server to read packets from 
   * - Perform protocol processing 
   * - Perform application processing 
   * - Outputs to terminal, or file if -o is specified 
   */ 
 
  // Parse arguments 
  parseArgs (args); 
   
  // Instantiates a new source, if it has not been instantiated already. 
  // The default source is Serial Forwarder. 
  if (source == null) { 
   source = new SFSource (hostValue,portValue); 
  } 
   
  // Instantiates a Packet Server 
  PacketServer packetServer = new PacketServer (source); 
  if (packetServer.start() == false) { // try to start the packet server  
   System.out.println("Error starting packet server"); 
   System.exit(1); 
  } 
 
  // Initialize outputs. ScreenOutput is always available. 
  Writer.addOutput (new ScreenOutput ()); 
  try { 
   Writer.open(); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   System.err.println(e.getMessage()); 
   try { 
    Writer.close(); 
   } catch (Exception e1) {} 
  } 
   
   
  // Get and process packets 
  for (;;) { 
   // Get packet 
   Packet packet = packetServer.getPacket(); 
   packetCount++; 
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   // Process packet 
   try { 
    Protocol.process (packet); 
    AM.process (packet); 
         
/************ Modified for Traffic Categorization August 28, 2006*************/ 
/*Copyright (c) 2006 Georgios Kirykos, Naval Postgraduate School (gkirykos@nps.edu). 
 * All rights reserved.*/ 
     
     
 String tempPacket = ScreenOutput.generateOutputString (packet); 
  StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(tempPacket," "); 
      
  System.out.println("Packet Categorization"); 
   String packetTime =   st.nextToken();   //get time 
   st.nextToken();    //ignore TOS 
  String packetIDAM = st.nextToken(); //get GroupID,Destination and AM  
   String numBytes = st.nextToken(); //get number of bytes  
  String numberofBytes = numBytes.substring(1,3);//get the number without the 
parenthesis of# bytes 
  String packetData = st.nextToken(); //get data part  
 String packetNodeID = packetData.substring(1,3);  //get the first two data point 
that identify node that packet was sent from  
      
  st = new StringTokenizer(packetIDAM,.”"); //chop down Group ID field 
      
  String packetGroupID = st.nextToken();  //get Grouo ID 
   String packetDestination = st.nextToken(); // destination address  
   String packetAM = st.nextToken();  // get AM number 
      
        
 /*Put it in a format with commas for CSV process**********/ 
     
System.out.println("Group ID - Destination -  AM    -    Time    -     Node ID - Number of 
Bytes" ); 
System.out.println(packetGroupID + "     ,    " + packetDestination + "    ,   " + packetAM 
+ "  ,  " + packetTime+ "    ,    " + packetNodeID); 
     
 oscv.printTraffic(packetGroupID ,  packetDestination  ,  packetAM , packetTime  , 
packetNodeID , numberofBytes);//Puts traffic elements into a CSV file 
dw.displayTraffic(packetGroupID ,  packetDestination  ,  packetAM , packetTime  , 
packetNodeID , numberofBytes);//Display traffic window 
      
      
 /************* End Modification for Traffic categorization ****************/ 
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    catch (Exception e) { 
    System.err.println(e.getMessage()); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  public void displayTraffic(String traffic) 
  { 
  } 
 private static void parseArgs (String[] args) { 
  /* Parse arguments. */ 
  CommandLine cmd = null; 
  Options options = new Options (); 
  // Define options 
options.addOption (OptionBuilder.withArgName ("host") 
.hasArg () 
.withDescription ("The host running Serial Forwarder. " + 
"Can be a valid hostname or IP address. " + "Default is local host.") 
    .create("h")); 
  options.addOption (OptionBuilder.withArgName ("port") 
    .hasArg () 
.withDescription ("Network port used by Serial Forwarder. " + "Default is 9001.") 
    .create("p")); 
  options.addOption (OptionBuilder.withArgName ("filename") 
    .hasArg () 
    .withDescription ("Output to file in CSV format.") 
    .create("oc")); 
  options.addOption (OptionBuilder.withArgName ("filename") 
    .hasArg () 
    .withDescription ("Output to file in raw binary format.") 
    .create("ob")); 
  options.addOption (OptionBuilder.withArgName ("filename") 
    .hasArg () 
    .withDescription ("Log screen output to file.") 
    .create("l")); 
  options.addOption (OptionBuilder.withArgName ("mica|micaz|telos") 
    .hasArg () 
    .withDescription ("Specifies TOS message format when 
auto-detection fails.") 
    .create("m")); 
  options.addOption ("?,”false,"Print this help text."); 
 
  // Parse command line options 
  CommandLineParser parse = new BasicParser(); 
  try { 
   cmd = parse.parse(options,args); 
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  } catch (ParseException e) { 
   cmd = null; 
  } 
  if ((cmd == null) || (cmd.hasOption("?"))) { 
   HelpFormatter f = new HelpFormatter(); 
   f.printHelp("java Sniffer,”options,true); 
   if (cmd==null) { 
    System.exit (1); 
   } else { 
    System.exit (0); 
   } 
  } 
 // Perform some sanity checks, and set system settings based on options 
  if (cmd.hasOption("h")) { 
   hostValue = cmd.getOptionValue("h"); 
   // TODO: Sanity check on the host value? 
  } 
    if (cmd.hasOption("p")) { 
   String portStr = cmd.getOptionValue("p"); 
   try { 
    portValue = Integer.parseInt(portStr); 
   } catch (NumberFormatException e) { 
    System.out.println ("Port argument must be an integer. 
Exiting."); 
    System.exit(1); 
   } 
   if ((portValue<0) || portValue>65535) { 
    System.out.println ("Invalid port argument. Exiting."); 
    System.exit (1); 
   } 
  } 
  if (cmd.hasOption("oc")) { 
   String filename = cmd.getOptionValue("oc"); 
   Writer.addOutput (new CSVFileOutput (filename)); 
  } 
  if (cmd.hasOption("ob")) { 
   String filename = cmd.getOptionValue("ob"); 
   Writer.addOutput (new BinaryFileOutput (filename)); 
  } 
  if (cmd.hasOption("l")) { 
   String filename = cmd.getOptionValue("l"); 
   Writer.addOutput (new LogFileOutput (filename)); 
  } 
  if (cmd.hasOption("m")) { 
   String value = cmd.getOptionValue("m"); 
   if (value.equalsIgnoreCase("mica")) { 
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    Packet.msgFormat= Packet.MSGFORMAT_MICA; 
   } else if (value.equalsIgnoreCase("micaz")) { 
    Packet.msgFormat = Packet.MSGFORMAT_MICAZ; 
   } else if (value.equalsIgnoreCase("telos")) { 
    // telos appears to use the same format as MICAZ 
    Packet.msgFormat = Packet.MSGFORMAT_MICAZ; 
    
   } else { 
    Packet.msgFormat = Packet.MSGFORMAT_UNKNOWN; 
    
   } 





B. ACTIVE MESSAGE JAVA CLASS 
This java program was created to parse the components of the packets in such 
way, so that all information of the packet will be ready for further analysis. 
 
/* Added For packet categorization 
 * activeMessage.java  
 * Used to extract the AM value as well as: destination address, originating address, 
group ID, time 
 * Copyright (c) 2006 Georgios Kirykos, Naval Postgraduate School 
(gkirykos@nps.edu). 





public class activeMessage { 
 public void writeFile (Packet packet) 
 {    
  String line_item = new String(); 
  StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(packet.toString()," "); 
  while (st.hasMoreElements()) 
  { 
   line_item = st.nextToken(); 
   System.out.println(line_item); 





C. OUTPUTTOCSV JAVA CLASS 
This java class put in to a CSV file, values separated with comma. 
/*Added For packet categorization  
 * outputtoCsv.java 
  * Used to map the AM value as well as: destination address, originating address, group 
ID, time 
  * to a CSV file (so then can be imported to an excel file) for further analysis and process 
  * Copyright (c) 2006 Georgios Kirykos, Naval Postgraduate School 
(gkirykos@nps.edu). 






 class outputtoCsv { 
  int count=0; 
 String Filename="c:\\outputtocvs_parentChild.txt"; 
   public void printTraffic (String packetGroupID,String 
packetDestination,String packetAM,String packetTime,String packetNodeID, String 
numberofBytes ) 
  { 
   count ++; 
   if (count == 60000) 
   { 
    Filename+="1"; 
   } 
   File cvs = new File(Filename);   
   try 
   { 
 BufferedWriter cvsout = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(cvs,true)); 
 cvsout.write(packetGroupID + "     ,    " + packetDestination + "    ,   " + 
packetAM + "  ,  " + packetTime+ "    ,    " + packetNodeID  + "  ,  " + numberofBytes); 
   cvsout.newLine(); 
   cvsout.close(); 
   } 
   catch (IOException e) 
   {  
   }}} 
    
D. DISPLAYWINDOW JAVA CLASS 
Provides a GUI for the traffic elements. 
/* 
 Added For packet categorization 
  * displayWindow.java 
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  * Used to display the AM value as well as: destination address, originating address, 
group ID, time 
  * Copyright (c) 2006 Georgios Kirykos, Naval Postgraduate School 
(gkirykos@nps.edu). 
 * All rights reserved. 
 */ 
 import javax.swing.*; 
 class displayWindow  { 
  JFrame jf = new JFrame("Traffic Categorization"); 
  JTextArea out = new JTextArea("Group ID - Destination -  AM -           Time -                    
Node ID    -     Number of Bytes "); 
    public displayWindow() { 
   jf.add(out); 
   jf.setSize(600,500); 
   jf.setLocation(300, 150); 
   out.setVisible(true); 
   jf.setVisible(true); 
  } 
    public void displayTraffic (String packetGroupID,String 
packetDestination,String packetAM,String packetTime,String packetNodeID,String 
numberofBytes ) { 
   String temp; 
   temp = out.getText() + "\n"; 
   temp += packetGroupID + "        ,        " + packetDestination + "         ,       
" + packetAM + "         ,       " + packetTime+ "       ,      " + packetNodeID + "          ,     " 
+ numberofBytes; 
     out.setText(temp); 




    
    
  
   
   
   
   




The scope for this appendix is to provide the user with some basic setting needed 
to configure the Serial Forwarder. All information needed to set up the WSN, in terms of 
installing the TinyOS, program the micaz’s and the TelosB can be found in reference [1]. 
In order to determine the USB port that the TelosB is connected to the PC that is 
used for the packet capturing the user should open cygwin window and type: motelist. 
The outcome is printed below and consists of three columns, where the second one with 




Moving to the Serial Forwarder setting, the user should stop the server and enter 
the following settings: Communication port and baud rate, which for this experiment 
where respectfully com4 and 57600. A help button is also available and its display as 
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